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THE FALSE PROMISE OF CONSUMER CHOICE* 
DEBORAH STONE** 
INTRODUCTION 
Faced with mounting costs of health insurance for its employees, the state 
of Missouri hired a consultant from PriceWaterhouseCoopers to help it figure 
out what to do.1  The consultant concluded that there were no answers to be 
found in other states, nor would it help to shop the state’s business around to 
different insurance carriers.2  Instead, the consultant suggested that Missouri 
offer “two plan choices” to its employees, in order to, as a Wall Street Journal 
reporter put it, “try to soften the rising cost for employees.” 3 
One plan had low monthly premiums but high co-payments.4  The other 
had high monthly premiums but lower co-payments.5  The idea, of course, was 
that healthier employees would choose the plan with lower monthly premiums, 
and sicker employees would choose the one with the lower co-pays.6  Both 
plans, however, increased employee cost-sharing compared to the previous 
year’s plan.7 
The Missouri story encapsulates the thrust of American health policy over 
the last thirty years: substitute free markets, market competition, and consumer 
sovereignty for the system of professional authority, non-profit and voluntary 
agencies, and bureaucratic regulation that once governed the medical sector.  
In these times, the new buzzwords for market reform are “consumer choice,” 
“consumer direction,” “consumer empowerment,” and “ownership.” 
 
* Copyright c (2005) by Transaction Publishers.  Reprinted by Permission of the Publisher. 
** Research Professor of Government, Dartmouth College.  Ph.D., Political Science, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology; B.A., Russian Studies, University of Michigan.  The 
author gratefully acknowledges Mark Schlesinger for general discussions over the years and help 
with citations. 
 1. Barbara Martinez, With Medical Costs Climbing, Workers Are Asked to Pay More, 
WALL ST. J., June 16, 2003, at A1. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Martinez, supra note 1. 
 7. Id. 
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In my view, the rhetorical emphasis on power and control for consumers 
disguises the real impact of market reforms, which is primarily to reduce the 
collective assistance and medical services that citizens receive.  In this article, I 
cast a skeptical eye on consumer choice as a mechanism to enhance social 
welfare. 
I.  FROM THEORY TO POLICY 
The theory of consumer choice says that given limited budgets, consumers 
think hard about their own needs and desires.  They seek good information 
about alternative ways of meeting their needs and desires, and ultimately, they 
make careful trade-offs to arrive at good decisions.  However, in health care, 
consumer behavior is distorted by health insurance.8  Because people with 
insurance do not pay the full cost of their medical care, they have few 
incentives to make careful decisions about consuming it.9  When their care is 
paid for by someone else (insurers), they do not see the price tag before they 
buy, and cost does not even enter into their thinking about whether to seek 
medical advice or what kinds of tests and treatments to undergo.10  “This has 
led to an absence of consumer vigilance,” explained Regina Herzlinger, one of 
the strongest advocates of consumer choice reforms.11  Therefore, the theory 
goes, reducing insurance coverage and placing more financial responsibility on 
the users of services will make them better, more knowledgeable, and 
responsible consumers of health care.12  “[B]y increasing deductibles and other 
payments, employees will think harder and become ‘more judicious buyers,’” 
wrote Milt Freudenheim in the New York Times, conveying the thoughts of the 
executive director of a business coalition.13  “Individuals empowered with 
health dollars will begin to act like consumers of health care,” explained a 
Manhattan Institute fellow in the Wall Street Journal.14 
At the same time, economic theory holds, consumers’ careful choices will 
necessarily enhance their well-being.  Choice increases consumer welfare 
primarily because every consumer knows better than anyone else what makes 
her happy.  Each consumer can make better decisions than anyone else could 
 
 8. See generally Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AM. 
ECON. REV. 531 (1968); Peter Zweifel & Willard G. Manning, Moral Hazard and Consumer 
Incentives in Health Care, in HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS: VOLUME 1A 409 (Anthony J. 
Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse eds., 2000). 
 9. See Pauly, supra note 8, at 531, 534–36; Zweifel & Manning, supra note 8, at 412–15. 
 10. See Pauly, supra note 8, at 531, 534–36; Zweifel & Manning, supra note 8, at 412–15. 
 11. Regina Herzlinger, The Quiet Health Care Revolution, 115 PUB. INT. 72, 89 (Spring 
1994). 
 12. See Pauly, supra note 8; Zweifel & Manning, supra note 8. 
 13. Milt Freudenheim, Employees Are Shouldering More of Health Care Tab, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 10, 2001, at C6. 
 14. David Gratzer, HSA Man vs. Healthzilla, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 2004, at A22. 
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make on her behalf.  Choice also increases consumer welfare because the 
experience of freedom is part of the “utility” consumers derive from having 
choice in the first place. 
Indeed, the health sector has been more dramatically reconfigured 
according to market theory than any other sector of social policy.  Starting in 
the 1970s, employer-based health insurance plans shifted from indemnity 
insurance (where a patient’s medical needs determined how much the insurer 
reimbursed) to pre-paid, capped-budget forms of insurance.15 Many plans 
placed annual and sometimes lifetime caps on specific benefits, such as mental 
health treatment or physical therapy, so that patients were required to ration 
their own treatments during the period of the cap.16  For people with 
disabilities, many programs have replaced the indemnity model of insurance 
with a cash-benefit model.  Instead of providing all the services disabled 
people need, cash-benefit programs give them a fixed budget and let them 
choose how to spend it until the money runs out.17 
Policymakers are thinking about similar approaches to restrain the 
burgeoning long-term care needs of the baby-boomer generation.  Perhaps, as 
one prominent long-term care specialist suggests, we should rethink “whether 
public programs and private market efforts should offer a defined set of 
services (the indemnity approach) or provide a cash benefit (the disability 
approach) that allows the consumer to decide how to use available resources to 
meet his or her long-term care needs.”18  This is a fancy way of describing the 
shift from the current Medicare program to the individual health savings 
accounts that the Bush Administration promotes.  From its inception, Medicare 
(and Medicaid) guaranteed its beneficiaries a defined set of services, based on 
their medical needs.  The savings account approach would guarantee them a 
fixed sum of money from which they would pay for their care.  If their care 
needs exceed their accounts, so be it. 
In all of these ways, market reforms invite people to treat their health as a 
consumer good and to approach diagnostic, curative, preventive, and 
rehabilitative services as if they were part of the family market basket.  Other 
reforms, such as the one in Missouri, address the consumption of health 
 
 15. See Jon R. Gabel et al., Withring on the Vine: The Decline of Indemnity Health 
Insurance, HEALTH AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2000, at 152 (describing the drop in indemnity health plans 
in job-based coverage). 
 16. See ALAN L. OTTEN, MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND, MENTAL HEALTH PARITY: WHAT 
CAN IT ACCOMPLISH IN A MARKET DOMINATED BY MANAGED CARE? (June 1998), available at 
http://www.milbank.org/mrparity.html; Patricia Anstett, Cost of Rehab Can Put New Limits on 
Patients: Insurers Often Cap Coverage for the Latest Spinal Cord Injury Treatments, DET. FREE 
PRESS, Jan. 22, 2007, at N1 (discussing lifetime limits on physical therapy coverage). 
 17. See Robyn I. Stone, Providing Long-Term Care Benefits in Cash: Moving to a Disability 
Model, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2001, at 96, 99–100. 
 18. Id. at 96. 
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insurance as opposed to health care. “Consumer-directed insurance” invites 
people to choose carefully among health insurance plans so that they might 
obtain the financial resources that best enable them to meet their future (as yet 
unknown) health care needs. 
Market theory is so influential that public policy encourages health care 
providers, too, to behave like judicious consumers.  If patients are supposed to 
monitor their consumption of insurance and medical care, providers are 
supposed to monitor their consumption of reimbursements (or revenues), 
allocating their fixed budgets to their highest-priority needs.  Diagnosis related 
groups (DRGs), a system of fixed, per-diagnosis hospital reimbursement that 
replaced the old cost-plus method of paying hospitals, pushes hospitals to 
discharge patients who do not “pay their own way” in reimbursements.  
Following the transition to DRGs, prospective payment systems have been 
applied to nursing homes, home health care, and outpatient care, causing each 
type of provider to regard patients as “profit centers” or losses, not merely as 
humans in need of care. 
II.  COST-CONSCIOUS HEALTH CARE CONSUMPTION 
To go back to the story at the beginning of this article, Audrey Simms is 
one of those Missouri state employees who was given a choice between two 
health insurance plans.19  Even though she has fairly high routine medical 
costs, she chose the low-monthly premium plan to save on her monthly bills.20  
She takes home about $1,230 a month.21  Her daughter has sickle-cell anemia 
and gets hospitalized frequently, costing Ms. Simms a $200 co-payment per 
admission.22  Living on $1,230 a month, Ms. Simms really had no choice but 
to take the low monthly premium/high deductible plan, even though the other 
plan would have cost her less in the long run.23  She simply did not have the 
cash flow to afford the higher premium plan. 
Like Ms. Simms, when people live at the margin, they are apt to choose the 
option with lowest short-term costs over the one with the lowest long-term or 
total costs.  People living at the margin—and that margin may be well up into 
the middle class when families face chronic disease, disability, job loss, 
income decline, and all the other factors that make for economic squeeze—are 
simply not able to behave like the rational economic actors of consumer choice 
theory.  They cannot afford to take the long-term view.  They are forced to be 
“penny wise and pound foolish.” 
 
 19. Martinez, supra note 1. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
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It is bad enough that many consumers can not afford to behave rationally 
in an economic sense.  Under constrained budgets, consumers are unable to 
behave rationally in a clinical sense either.  Ms. Simms is supposed to take 
several drugs for chronic conditions, but with the high co-payment plan, she 
faces a squeeze every time she has to decide whether to fill a prescription.  
“Audrey Simms can’t afford to get all three of her prescriptions filled each 
month.  So she alternates, sometimes skipping her thyroid medication, at other 
times forgoing her acid-reflux pills or her hormone treatment.”24 
When health care consumers are given the “freedom” to allocate limited 
care dollars, they are pushed to choose on the basis of cost, not medical 
criteria.  Co-payments and other up-front costs are intended to make people 
economically conscious, and indeed, they do push economic criteria to the 
forefront of consumer consciousness, displacing medical criteria. 
What does it really mean to become a cost-conscious consumer of health 
care?  To understand how cost-conscious consumers use health care, we have 
only to look at people who lack health insurance.  As consumer choice 
advocates never tire of saying, nobody is more cost-conscious than someone 
who has to pay their full medical care bills by themselves.  And what we know 
from voluminous studies of the uninsured is that people without health 
insurance are not—cannot be—wise consumers. 
When people are uninsured, they postpone or avoid doctor visits, do not 
fill prescriptions, and fail to seek or continue prescribed follow-up care.25  
Under tight budget constraints, they choose between filling this prescription or 
that prescription, between taking the prescribed doses or skipping doses, 
between getting themselves treated and getting another family member treated, 
or between having their chest pains checked out or not.  They often delay 
seeking professional advice, and even when they do seek advice, they often go 
without appropriate care. 
“Like many elderly people on fixed incomes,” the Wall Street Journal 
wrote about a New York City woman who has no health insurance, “Ms. Kaur 
often tries to stretch her prescriptions—and her budget—by skipping doses [of 
her glaucoma medication] for days and weeks at a time.  Sometimes she stops 
taking a medication if she doesn’t feel it’s working well.  Sometimes she 
ignores a doctor’s advice because she can’t afford the prescriptions.”26  Ms. 
Kaur is blind in one eye from her glaucoma, and is at high risk of developing 
glaucoma and losing sight in the other eye.27  One ophthalmologist who has 
 
 24. Martinez, supra note 1. 
 25. COMM. ON CONSEQUENCES OF UNINSURANCE, INSTIT. OF MEDICINE, CARE WITHOUT 
COVERAGE: TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE 28 (2002). 
 26. Lucette Lagnado, Uninsured and Ill: A Woman is Forced to Ration Her Care, WALL ST. 
J., Nov. 12, 2002, at A1. 
 27. Id. 
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seen her says she needs to be monitored closely, but her pattern of seeking care 
is “erratic.”28  She owes hundreds of dollars to the clinics she has visited over 
the years.29  “Ms. Kaur has become a virtual fugitive from health care—or at 
least from hospitals and clinics to which she owes money,” the Wall Street 
Journal explains.30 
People without health insurance do not get immunizations, cancer 
screening tests, dental hygiene, and other preventive services nearly as often as 
people who do have insurance.  They receive much less care for chronic 
conditions.  They are unable to take (because they cannot afford) prescription 
drugs regularly, or to undergo monitoring and follow-up care.  Uninsured 
people with hypertension, for example, are less likely to have their blood 
pressure monitored and to begin or stay on drug therapy.  Uninsured people 
with diabetes are less likely to have their blood glucose monitored and 
controlled.  As a consequence, the uninsured are more likely to suffer more 
severe consequences of their illness and injuries; they are more likely to die 
from them.  Women with breast cancer, for example, have a 30% to 50% 
higher risk of dying from it if they are uninsured than if they are insured.31 
What about people who do have health insurance?  Do they behave any 
differently when their plans require them to bear more of the costs of care and 
thus behave more cost-consciously?  A RAND study of 90,000 people with 
chronic diseases such as diabetes and hypertension found that doubling co-
payments for prescription drugs results in a 10% to 12% decrease in use of 
drugs for those conditions.32  Other studies have found similar inverse 
relationships between cost-sharing and use of essential drugs.33  One Nebraska 
man, to “prepare” for the likelihood that his Medicaid benefits would be cut, 
began taking less of his diabetes medicine and “stockpiling” pills for later.34 
There is indeed price elasticity in health care consumption, just as 
economic theory predicts.  But elasticity in medical consumption decisions is a 
good thing only if there is a corresponding “clinical elasticity” in health status 
when patients consume their medical care as if it were a discretionary good.  If 
a person with high blood pressure takes his hypertension medicine only 90% of 
the time, does he receive 90% of the protection against stroke?  Or—more 
likely—does his risk of stroke rise dramatically because of his erratic blood 
pressure control?  Ms. Kaur, the uninsured woman with glaucoma who was the 
subject of Wall Street Journal story on the uninsured, once “stretched her 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. COMM. ON CONSEQUENCES OF UNINSURANCE, supra note 25. 
 32. See Martinez, supra note 1. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Sarah Lueck, Facing A Crunch, States Drop Thousands From Medicaid Roles, WALL 
ST. J., June 26, 2003, at A1. 
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cache of prescriptions out for more than a year by using them only when her 
eye felt its worst.”35  She told the reporter that she thought to herself, “‘Why 
am I wasting the money’ on doctor visits?”36 
Consumer-driven medical care decisions would seem to undermine the 
basic tenets of preventive medicine: regular check-ups, monitoring, and 
compliance with prescribed therapies.  Medical care decision-making by the 
uninsured and the underinsured is the clinical equivalent of “penny wise and 
pound foolish.”  Market reforms that offer people more choice over how they 
spend less money will generate “penny wise, pound foolish” medical care. 
Cost-conscious health care decisions are often terrible clinical decisions 
because they substitute relatively uninformed lay decision-makers for highly-
trained expert decision-makers.  In tight straits, with not enough money to pay 
for all needed medical care, consumers ration their own care.  They engage in 
self-prescribing, deciding which prescriptions to fill, and how much medicine 
to take.  They engage in self-referral, deciding when and whether to seek 
medical help largely on the basis of cost instead of on the basis of medical 
need or their own concerns about their symptoms.  They engage in self-
triaging instead of letting professionally trained personnel make these 
judgments. This is perhaps the worst feature of the consumer choice approach: 
it substitutes lay judgment for professional judgment.  It undermines the 
professionalism and expertise that is supposed to be at the heart of modern 
medicine.  It undermines the evidence-based decision-making that we 
otherwise try so hard to promote in the health care system. 
III.  INFORMATION IS NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR MONEY AND SERVICES 
The theory of consumer choice says that if people have enough 
information and the right kinds of information, they can make the best 
decisions that will yield the greatest individual and collective welfare.  Better 
information and better ways of distributing information are the answers to all 
the problems with consumer sovereignty. But this part of the theory is as 
flawed as the rest. 
One major arena for consumer choice is health insurance.  In theory, if 
consumers choose among different insurance plans by finding the plan best 
suited to their medical needs, health care expenditures will be spent in the most 
efficient way possible for society as a whole.  Under consumer choice reforms, 
people are exhorted to make wise health insurance purchasing decisions.  In an 
article tellingly titled, “Your Health Plan’s New Math,” the Wall Street Journal 
advises, “Whether a plan is a good buy or a bad one will depend, in part, on 
your health care needs.”37  Exactly, and therein lies a problem. 
 
 35. Lagnado, supra note 26. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Ruth Simon, Your Health Plan’s New Math, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2003, at D1. 
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When choosing among health insurance plans, consumers need to take into 
account their current health status, how it is likely to change, what illnesses 
and injuries they are likely to get, what care and drugs they are likely to need, 
and what drugs and new treatments are likely to become available.  If they are 
choosing insurance for family members, they have to assess all these factors 
for other people as well.38  Yet, people cannot know most of these things.  Few 
of us are very well informed about specific diseases and their treatment until 
we get sick with one of them.  And to the extent future health care needs are 
unknowable, choosing health insurance plans wisely requires unknowable 
information. 
Making good choices among prescription drug discount plans is equally 
difficult. Different plans cover different drugs; different drugstores honor 
different cards. Consumers can shop on the basis of what drugs they are 
currently taking, but if their needs change, the benefits or savings they derive 
from their card will change, too.39  When the new Medicare benefit plan was 
rolled out in May 2004, most consumers were baffled.  One woman studied her 
options and found she faced “73 competing drug discount cards, each 
providing different savings on different medications and all subject to 
change.”40  “Even the person who came to explain it to us didn’t understand 
it,” said a woman who had attended an education session at a senior center.41  
A U.S News & World Report article concluded that a person would need 
multiple cards to increase the odds that their drugs were covered and that the 
advertised features of cards are so disparate that “comparison shopping is all 
but impossible.”42 
Good consumers are supposed to take into account their own “tastes and 
preferences”—how they feel about their medical status, how much their 
symptoms bother them, how much they care about their health relative to other 
things they value, and how much they can tolerate risk.  These feelings are also 
uncertain.  People do not know very well how they are going to feel about 
discomfort, pain, and disability until they experience them, or how frightened 
they will be about a risk until they confront it. 
Whether the choices are clinical or financial, health care choices are 
inherently complex and unwieldy.  Even if people could have all the answers 
to the relevant questions about their health care choices, sometimes “enough” 
information makes choices too complex, overwhelming, and even paralyzing.  
Social psychologists find that most people experience “information overload.”  
 
 38. Id. 
 39. See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., PRESCRIPTION DRUG DISCOUNT CARDS: SAVINGS DEPEND 
ON PHARMACY AND TYPE OF CARD USED 17 (Sept. 2003). 
 40. John Leland, 73 Options for Medicare Plan Fuel Chaos, Not Prescriptions, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 12, 2004, at A1. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Avery Comarow, Plastic Price Cuts?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 15, 2002, at 74. 
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Even when people are offered a very limited range of alternatives, as is often 
the case with health insurance plans, if each option has several important 
features that must be compared, the decision becomes overwhelming.  People 
are likely to oversimplify and ignore some factors.43  For example, in simple 
consumer choices among chocolates or jams, items much less emotion-laden 
than health care, people faced with more than about six options find the 
experience of choosing unsatisfying and are more likely to decide not to buy 
anything rather than choose among the options.44 
What about choosing medical treatments once a person is already ill?  A 
huge infrastructure of “informed consent” is supposed to ensure that patients 
have the proper information before they make choices, especially choices 
about invasive diagnostic tests, surgery, and highly risky treatments and 
procedures.  Armed with good information, each patient can in theory take 
responsibility for the quality of his or her care.  But informed consent is often a 
pro forma ritual that discourages patients from asking too many questions and 
thinking hard about their choices.45  Patients are apt to have long legalistic 
forms thrust at them and are told to sign.  The forms are typically administered 
by non-medical, clerical staff who do not understand the first thing about the 
medical issues confronting the patient. 
A few years ago, I went into a hospital for a breast biopsy. (It was benign.)  
The admitting clerk handed me a consent form, saying, “This just allows us to 
bill your insurance company.”  I read it over.  Billing my insurer was only one 
of about six or seven things for which the form asked my permission.  Most 
notable to me was authorization for the hospital and its physicians to do 
anything to me they deemed necessary while I was in their custody.  Given that 
I was going in for a breast biopsy and given the history of breast cancer 
treatment—namely radical mastectomies performed at the surgeon’s discretion 
without consultation with the woman—I found this consent form horrifying, no 
matter that I had discussed this very issue with my surgeon and that she had 
assured me she never did surgical treatment or even lymph node dissections at 
the same time as the initial biopsy. 
I pointed out to the admitting clerk that the form was about more than 
permission to bill my insurer.  “Oh really?”  She professed surprise.  Only faith 
in my doctor, not the law, gave me any sense that I had some control over the 
medical “choice” I was making.  Moreover, facing the possibility of breast 
 
 43. See Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care “Patient Protection” Laws: 
Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 51–54 
(1999). 
 44. BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS 19–20 (2004) 
(citing Shanto Iyengar & M. Lepper, When Choice is Demotivating: Can One Desire Too Much 
of a Good Thing, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 995 (2000)). 
 45. See RUTH FADEN & THOMAS A. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED 
CONSENT 91–100 (1986). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
484 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:475 
cancer and having already considered three different surgeons, I did not feel I 
had any choice about whether to have a biopsy or whether to have it at this 
hospital rather than another.  The hospital’s informed consent procedures did 
not add anything to the information I had already gathered, nor did they make 
me feel any more “free” in my decision to undergo the procedure. 
The inadequacy (if not sham) of informed consent is a topic unto itself, but 
one new development in patient information has probably done more than 
anything else to decrease the effectiveness of informed consent procedures.  
Ever since the implementation of the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act privacy regulations in 2003,46 every medical encounter 
now begins with patients being handed a privacy notice and told they must sign 
it.  What they are actually asked to sign is an acknowledgment that they have 
received a copy of the provider’s privacy policies with respect to medical 
information, but few patients understand that distinction.  The privacy notices 
are typically two to four pages long, written in bureaucratese.  One notice I 
received (from Concord Imaging Center in Concord, New Hampshire) was 
four pages, single spaced—just to have to an ultrasound examination.  I would 
not have had time to “read it carefully,” as the instructions in bold capital 
letters at the top of the first page urged me to do, even had I wanted to.  Most 
patients believe they must sign the privacy practices form in order to receive 
treatment, and few bother to read these notices.  Thus, a law meant to enhance 
patient rights probably has the perverse effect of inuring medical consumers to 
printed information. 
At Concord Imaging Center, there is a large wooden wastebasket just 
inside the door to the waiting area.  A sign taped to the side of the basket says, 
“Please Discard Unwanted Privacy Notices Here.”  On a recent day at about 5 
p.m., the basket was two-thirds full of white and yellow sheets.  The white 
sheets were the four-page description of the Center’s privacy policies.  The 
yellow sheets were the patients’ copies of the form they had signed 
acknowledging they had received the white sheets.  The wastebasket, it seems 
to me, is pretty good measure of how much consumers value the information 
they receive. 
 
 46. In 2002, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) promulgated regulations 
governing the use of personal medical information by health care providers and insurers.  45 
C.F.R. §§ 164.500–164.534 (2003).  These regulations were mandated by the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 and went into effect on April 14, 2001, though health 
care entities did not have to comply with rule until April 14, 2003.  U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. 
Servs. Off. for Civ. Rts., General Overview of Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable 
Health Information (Apr. 2003), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/hipaa/guidelines/ 
overview.pdf. 
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IV.  CONSUMER CHOICE AS PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 
Even at the very core and essence of medical care—clinical decision-
making—the ideology of consumerism has made its mark.  Before the rise of 
market thinking in health policy, American culture located medicine firmly in 
the domain of science.  Physicians and medical researchers, as Paul Starr noted 
in his history of American medicine, exercised an almost unquestioned cultural 
authority.47  Whatever doctors prescribed or recommended, insurers and 
patients tried to obtain.  Third party insurers saw their role as helping patients 
afford whatever doctors recommended. 
Over the second half of the twentieth century, the sheer technical capacity 
of medical personnel to perform helpful diagnostic, therapeutic, and 
rehabilitative procedures fuelled an explosion of health care costs.  Economic 
theory, though, blames most of the cost growth on distorted consumer 
incentives.  Insurance, or third party payment, the theory goes, removes budget 
constraints from patients and allows them to think of medical care as free.  
Without economic constraints, patients are wont to accept medical advice 
uncritically and run up the medical tab with abandon. (Remember Herzlinger 
decrying the lack of “consumer vigilance.”)48  Based on this economic theory, 
the gist of most health insurance reforms since the 1970s was to “restore” 
proper economic incentives to patients—in other words, to get people to think 
of health care as the consumption of material goods rather than as the receipt 
of professional advice and help. 
This shift in cultural thinking about the nature of medical care began with a 
simple idea: cost is one dimension of medical care, not the only dimension, but 
a dimension that ought to be considered when people make decisions about 
their care. Professional judgment would still be the most important aspect of 
clinical decision-making.  Almost inevitably, however, once the door was 
opened for lay people to participate in clinical decision-making as consumers, 
lay judgment gained a kind of authority and weight almost equal to 
professional judgment.  Worse, the rhetoric of consumer empowerment 
disguises the real social trade-offs behind the consumer choice movement.  
Under the twin banner of  “consumer freedom” and “citizen power,” consumer 
choice reforms such as Missouri’s new health insurance plan actually take 
away resources and options.  The bottom line: citizens like Ms. Simms get less 
medical care and probably suffer poorer health. 
The story of Missouri’s health insurance reform for state employees 
reflects the general trend in American social policy: give people less help, but 
more choice.  Give them meager allotments, but wax eloquent about how they 
are getting “options” and “autonomy” and “freedom of choice.”  It is a trend 
toward replacing substance with process, toward replacing actual social aid 
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with mechanisms of consumer choice, and toward replacing a commitment to 
meeting individuals’ needs with a commitment to meeting collective budgets. 
Contemporary American social thought is enamored of the consumer 
choice idea.  No matter what the problem—education, housing, retirement 
income, or health care—consumer choice promises to contain costs and 
enhance quality by empowering citizens. By giving people “ownership” of the 
resources to meet their needs, as George W. Bush called his bids for 
privatization of Medicare and Social Security during the 2004 campaign, 
government can harness consumers’ savvy and energy to make health care or 
any social service more efficient and effective.  We see the same trend in the 
shift from defined-benefit to defined-contribution pension plans, in the push to 
replace Social Security and Medicare with private savings accounts and 
individual investments, in the move toward individually-spendable vouchers to 
replace public schools and public housing, and in replacement of a welfare 
entitlement with a limited lifetime budget of social assistance. 
The consumer choice approach to social policy represents a cynical turn in 
American public philosophy.  It is cynical to think that people will feel better 
about deprivation or bad outcomes as long as they believe they have had a 
hand in choosing their fate.  Instead of giving people greater access and higher-
quality care, as the theory holds, consumer choice offers citizens procedural 
comfort but less substantive help.  More often than not, “consumer choice” and 
“consumer direction” are glittery wrappings in which employers, insurers, and 
politicians package benefit reductions, program contractions, and budget cuts. 
Giving people a budget that is too small for their needs does not give them 
the experience of freedom.  Instead, they experience every decision not as a 
free choice but as a terrible trade-off.  Ms. Simms told the Wall Street Journal 
that her drugs now cost her as much as $40 each in co-payments.  “So I decide 
between . . . medicine and . . . food. . . . And I have a 12-year old daughter to 
feed.”49  I doubt Ms. Simms feels liberated by having made her choice or that 
her welfare has been improved by having had a choice to make.  She could not 
have afforded the other high monthly premium plan either, so it seems unlikely 
that having a choice “softened the blow” when Missouri cut her benefits. 
Giving people freedom to make their own clinical choices is not likely to 
improve access and quality of care so long as they have to make decisions in 
the context of very strained financial resources.  So long as they must factor 
finances into their every medical care consumption decision, they are apt to 
choose on the basis of costs, not medical criteria.  They will ration their own 
care, decide for themselves when to seek professional advice, which drugs to 
take, and which tests and treatments to undergo.  Consumer choice elevates lay 
decision-making over professional and expert decision-making.  By most 
definitions of quality, health care suffers. 
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Health and medical care are rife with uncertainty.  Health financing and 
medical care choices are gambles.  Whether the gambler wins or loses depends 
not so much on the wisdom of the choice but on the luck of the draw.  The 
imagery of better information and informed decision-making shifts moral 
responsibility onto individuals.  Through the theory of consumer choice, 
citizens are taught to believe that if they lose the great health sweepstakes, if 
they need more care than they can afford or than society is willing to provide 
them, or if their diagnostic and therapeutic decisions do not pan out as they 
hoped, it is their own fault.  They could have made better choices. 
Consumer choice theory is thus an ideology.  It is a way of seeing the 
world, and particularly, a way of interpreting social justice.  It is a philosophy 
that minimizes communal obligations to citizens, maximizes individual 
responsibility for one’s own well-being, and tolerates great inequalities in well-
being as morally acceptable.  It replaces a social commitment to meeting needs 
with commitment to meeting budgets.  It uses the rhetoric of “freedom” and 
“autonomy” to justify the abdication of social responsibility and the failure to 
provide appropriate and compassionate care. 
There is an alternative vision.  Instead of individuals being responsible for 
their own health and well-being, communities are responsible for the well-
being of their members.  Yes, individuals bear responsibility to act wisely, with 
foresight, restraint, and creativity, but they do not and cannot control all that 
happens to them, most especially not in the realm of health.  That is why we 
live in communities.  We hope to help the people we love and we hope that 
other people will care about us and help us when we are in need. 
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